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Abstract— Smart cards are widely used along with PayTV 
receivers to store secret user keys and to perform security 
functions to prevent any unauthorized viewing of PayTV 
channels.  Java Card technology enables programs written in the 
Java programming language to run on smart cards. Smart cards 
represent one of the smallest computing platforms in use today. 
The memory configuration of a smart card are of the order of 4K 
of RAM, 72K of EEPROM, and 24K of ROM. Using Java card 
provides advantages to the industry in terms of ease of coding, 
faster time to market and faster upgrades as compared to plain 
smart cards . Also different applications like payTV, e-commerce, 
health-card can easily be implemented in a single java card as 
multiple applets corresponding to each application can coexists in 
a single java card. But there are security concerns in java cards 
and also the performance issues.  In this paper, we analyse the 
suitability of using Java card for PayTV applications as part of 
conditional access system in place of plain smart cards. 
Keywords- Smart Card, Java Card,  PayTV, Conditional Access 
System (CAS),  Cryptography 
 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
Satellite PayTV network consists of a head-end, uplinking 
transmission system, satellite and reception system along with 
subscriber Management system (SMS) and subscriber 
Authorization System (SAS).   At the head-end (transmit side), 
the digital content (including video, audio and data), which the 
operator wishes to restrict access, is scrambled (DVB-CSA) 
by the control word (CW) derived from a constantly changing 
pseudo-random binary sequence generator. The control word 
also needs to be protected: the control word is encrypted with 
a service key ( also called authorization key ) (SK / AK) . The 
encrypted control word is then packaged into entitlement 
control message (ECM). Then, the service key is encrypted 
with the individual key (IK) supplied by the subscriber 
management system (SMS) and is then packaged with 
entitlement data into entitlement management message 
(EMM). Finally, the scrambled content, entitlement control 
message, and entitlement management message are together 
broadcasted in the same channel. This is shown as in Figure 1. 
               At the reception-end, the set-top box (STB) and 
smart card authenticate each other. STB filters entitlement 
management message and entitlement control message 
according to the parameters provided by the smart card (SC) 
and then forwards these messages to smart card. Smart card 
decrypts entitlement management message using individual 
key stored in smart card to get service key/authorization key 
and the entitlement data. After having passed the verification 
of the access entitlement, smart card uses the service key to 
decrypt the encrypted control word and returns the control 
word towards set-top box so that set-top box will be allowed 
to descramble the scrambled content. This is shown in the 
Figure 2. The smart card and part of STB where entitlement 
messages are filtered and smart card handshake takes place is 
called conditional access sub system. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. PayTV Headend 
 
Figure 2. PayTV Receiver 
 
Java Card technology enables programs written in the Java 
programming language to run on smart cards. A JavaCard is a 
typical smart card: it conforms to all smart card standards and 
thus requires no change to existing smart card-aware 
applications. However, JavaCard has a specific important 
feature that makes it unique: a Java Virtual Machine is 
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implemented in its read-only memory (ROM) mask. The JVM 
controls the access to all smart card resources, such as 
memory and I/O, and thus essentially serves as the smart 
card’s operating system. The JVM executes a Java bytecode 
subset on the smart card, ultimately providing the functions 
accessible from outside, such as signature, log-in, and loyalty 
applications. Java Card offers definite advantages over plain 
Smart cards in terms of ease of programming, faster time to 
market, coexistence of multiple applications, interoperability 
etc.  In this paper we analyse the suitability of using java card 
for PayTV applications as part of conditional access system in 
place of plain smart cards. In Section II, we list the advantages 
and disadvantages of Java Card over conventional Smart card.  
Section III analyses java card technology in detail from 
architecture and security point of view. In Section IV, we give 
the requirements to be met by java card for using in PayTV 
application. In Section V, we have given the experimental 
setup and performance details of java card. Section VI, gives 
the conclusion. 
 
II.     ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF JAVA 
CARD   
 
A. Advantages of Java Card 
 
There are several advantages of java card over plain smart 
cards. The following are the main advantages of Java Cards: 
    
 Interoperable: Applets developed with Java Card 
technology runs on any Java Card technology-based smart 
card, independently of the card vendor and underlying 
hardware. 
 Secure: Java Card technology relies on the inherent 
security of the Java programming language to provide a secure 
execution environment. It was designed through an open 
process, and the platform's proven industry deployments and 
security evaluations ensure that card issuers benefit from the 
most capable and secure state of the art technology. 
  Multi-Application Capable: Java Card technology enables 
multiple applications to co-exist securely on a single smart 
card. Hence same card can be used for several end 
applications. 
  Dynamic: New applications can be installed securely after 
a card has been issued, providing card issuers with the ability 
to dynamically respond to their customer's changing needs. 
 Open: Java Card application developers benefit from 
object-oriented programming and design, and have access to 
off-the-shelf Java development tools.  
Faster Development: Because of Java based development 
environment, this gives the advantage of faster time to market 
and also debugging easier and more error free code can be 
developed faster compared to a native application 
development. 
Compatible with Existing Standards:  The Java Card API is 
compatible with international standards for smart cards such as 
ISO7816, or EMV. It is referenced by major industry-specific 
standards such as Global Platform and ETSI. 
 
B. Disadvantages of Java Card 
 
Although java card offers lot of advantages, it also has a 
few disadvantages; following are the main disadvantages of 
Java card: 
 
Less Memory Space: Java Card Run time Environment 
occupies extra memory space in the java card, hence the 
memory space available for the user application reduces. 
Slower:  Java code execution is normally slower than the 
native code written in middle level or low level programming 
languages.  
Security: Because java card is an open system, security 
through obscurity does not workout.  
 
III.    JAVA CARD TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY 
A. Java Card Technology 
 
Before going into security issues let us first discuss about 
Java Card Architecture. 
As shown in the figure-3, the low level operations like 
physical data transfer, file management, communication 
and instruction execution are handled by microcontroller 
program and operating system. 
 
 
Figure 3. JAVA Card Architecture 
 
JCRE (Java Card Runtime Environment) sits over this layer 
and it consists of Java Card API, JCVM (Java Card Virtual 
Machine) and native methods. The native methods are 
platform dependent and they directly interact with underlying 
operating system, it provides services like cryptography, 
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memory allocation and I/O operations. Java Card API also 
called as framework consists of all Java packages required for 
various Java Card functionalities. JCVM executes the Java 
Byte Code just like JVM but the difference is that JCVM is 
split into two parts. One is Java Card Converter which is off-
card, converts .class files into card compatible format (.cap 
files) and the other is on-card part which interprets the byte 
code. JCRE and operating system program are stored into 
ROM at the time of manufacture of chip while card 
applications are loaded into EEPROM. 
 
         Java Card Language Subset: Because of its small 
memory footprint, the Java Card platform supports only a 
carefully chosen, customized subset of the features of the Java 
language. This subset includes features that are well suited for 
writing programs for smart cards and other small devices 
while preserving the object-oriented capabilities of the Java 
programming language. Table 1 highlights some notable 
supported and unsupported Java language features. Keywords 
of the unsupported features are also omitted from the 
language. Many advanced Java smart cards provide a garbage 
collection mechanism to enable object deletion. 
 
TABLE 1: Supported and Unsupported Java Card features 
 
 
Supported Java feature Unsupported Java Feature 
 Small primitive data 
types: boolean, byte, 
short  
 One-dimensional 
arrays 
 Java packages, classes, 
interfaces, and 
exceptions 
 Java object-oriented 
features: 
inheritance,virtual 
methods, overloading 
and dynamic object 
creation, access scope, 
and binding rules 
 The int keyword and 
32-bit integer data type 
support are optional. 
 Large primitive data 
types: long, double, 
float  
 Characters and strings 
 Multidimensional 
arrays 
 Dynamic class loading 
 Security manager 
 Garbage collection 
and finalization 
 Threads 
 Object serialization 
 Object cloning 
 
 
         Java Card Application Deployment: Java card 
application is first compiled using Java compiler and class 
files are obtained. These class files are converted into cap files 
(Converted Applet files) and then installed on to the card as 
shown in the figure 4. Now applet must be installed and 
registered in the card. This is done either by the installation 
program sitting on JCRE or by the install method of abstract 
applet class. When the installation and registration is 
successful, an applet is instanced and all objects related to it 
are created. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Java Card Application Deployment  
 
 
B. Java Card Security  
 
1. Java card security features: 
 
Java Card provides lot of security features like applet 
firewalls, Java type safe, object sharing etc. As smart card uses 
cryptography technique for data encryption, Java Card 
provides Crypto API. We discuss about the features in detail 
below: 
 
      Prohibition of Dynamic Class Loading:  Java Card does 
not allow dynamic class loading. This means that Java classes 
are not be downloaded on-the-fly during execution; a security 
risk assumed by standard Java. Instead, Java applets are 
usually burned in during masking when the card is initialized 
and personalized prior to being fielded.  
      Applet Firewall: Java Card can handle multiple applets and 
these applets can be from different venders so it is not secured 
if objects of one applet are accessible to another applet. Java 
Card uses applet firewall and type safe feature of Java to 
restrict unauthorized access of data. That is Java Card defines 
context for each applet which represents all the objects 
accessible to a particular applet. 
      Object Sharing: Java Card also provides a facility to share 
objects by implementing Sharable interface. This allows the 
applets to share objects and at the same time it restricts them 
from accessing methods which are accessible only to the 
owner of the object that is remote method invocation is not 
allowed. 
      Java Card API:  The Java Card APIs consist of a set of 
customized classes for programming smart card applications 
according to the ISO 7816 model. The APIs contain three core 
packages and one extension package. The three core packages 
are java.lang, javacard.framework, and javacard.security. The 
 
 
 
OFF CARD VM 
 
CONVERTER 
 
 
 
ON CARD VM 
 
JCRE 
 
JAVA 
COMPILER 
JAVA 
APPLET 
FILE 
CLASS FILE 
CAP FILE 
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,  
Vol. 11, No.6, 2013 
extension package is javacardx.crypto. Many Java platform 
classes are not supported in the Java Card APIs. For example, 
the Java platform classes for GUI interfaces, network I/O, and 
desktop file system I/O are not supported. The reason is that 
smart cards do not have a display, and they use a different 
network protocol and file system structure. Also, many Java 
platform utility classes are not supported, to meet the strict 
memory requirements. The classes in the Java Card APIs are 
compact. They include classes adapted from the Java platform 
for providing Java language support and cryptographic 
services. They also contain classes created especially for 
supporting the smart card ISO 7816 standard. 
 
2. Security Risks in Java Card 
 
    Although java card offers lot of security features, it also has 
few security risks. The following are the main risks associated 
with java cards. 
 
      Absence of Garbage Collection: In Java, Garbage 
Collection feature controls the freed and unused objects of the 
applet but this feature is absent in Java Card (because of its 
memory and processor resource limitations) which may cause 
serious threat like handle of a free object is allocated to a new 
object. If any error occurs in the program then the memory 
allocated to the object is never freed which lead to memory 
leakage. This is a serious problem especially on smart card 
with such limited memory resources and application may get 
hanged up in the middle of transaction and suffer from denial-
of-service attack.  
     Native methods: JCRE interacts with card resources using 
native methods which are mostly written in C or C++, card 
vender can upgrade card by adding new native methods and 
applets can use these methods. Java card firewalls have no 
control over these native methods so all the firewall security 
fails when it comes to native methods. 
     Exception Handling: Another security threat is with 
exception handling, it can be controlled if applets are 
intensively tested using testing tools before loading on card. If 
an exception is not handled in any of the called methods it 
becomes unpredictable and may hang the applet and corrupt 
the card. 
      Protocol Interactions: In today's smart card market, multi-
application cards are becoming very common and also 
convenient. That is, rather then carrying several different cards 
for different purposes, the applications are integrated on a 
single card. For example, a smart card may provide driver's 
license or social security identification, a credit line, a debit 
account, e-cash, health insurance information, calling card 
applications, digital certificates for authentication, and 
different loyalty programs. Insofar as multiple applications 
implement different protocols (many of which may require 
authentication), unintended protocol interactions may 
compromise the security of the card and its multiple 
applications. Because of small memory constraints in smart 
cards, it is currently impractical to store unique cryptographic 
public/private key pairs for each different application 
requiring cryptographic functions. Because of this, multiple 
applications often share the same key material. Different 
protocols that share the same key material can introduce 
potential security problems that would not otherwise exist with 
each protocol considered in isolation. That is, the security of 
two different protocols do not necessarily compose, especially 
given protocol interactions.  
       Physical Security: The physical security risks of Java 
cards are same as those of plain smart cards. Various physical 
attacks like, DPA (differential Power Analysis) need to be 
countered measured in Java Cards in a similar way that of 
plain smart cards. 
 
IV.    REQUIREMENTS TO BE MET BY JAVA CARDS FOR USING IN 
PAYTV APPLICATION 
 
A. Security of Cryptographic  Algorithms 
 
In PayTV applications, both symmetric and asymmetric 
algorithms are used. Although, PayTV standards does not 
mandate usage of any specific cryptographic algorithm for key 
distribution and scrambling, but  generally two layer security 
scheme is employed as mentioned in the section I of this paper.  
Symmetric cryptographic algorithm like AES and Triple DES 
are used. An asymmetric algorithm like RSA is used. Pseudo 
Random numbers are required to be generated as part of 
authentication protocol used as session keys between smart 
card and STB. The implementation of complex crypto 
algorithm shall be easier and faster through standard APIs. 
 
B. Confirmation to ISO7816 standard 
 
The Smart Card – PayTV receiver interface is ISO 7816, 
hence the Java card shall also confirm to this specification. 
The Java Card APIs consist of a set of customized classes for 
programming smart card applications according to the ISO 
7816 model. The classes in the Java Card APIs are compact. 
They include classes adapted from the Java platform for 
providing Java language support and cryptographic services. 
They also contain classes created especially for supporting the 
smart card ISO 7816 standard. 
 
C. High Security:  
 
    In the payTV scenario, if the control word (CW) is cracked, 
then the TV channels can be decoded unauthorised. This will 
lead to huge revenue loss to the operator. The Smart Card and 
the receiver – any one of these two may be malicious; hence 
requires bi-directional authentication so that the receiver is 
able to verify the identity of the Smart Card and also Smart 
Card is able to verify the identity of the receiver. Otherwise, a 
cloned smart card will be able to decode the CW or a fake 
receiver will be able to store secret information from a genuine 
Smart Card and create large number of fake Smart Cards. It 
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shall be possible to implement bi-directional authentication in 
Java Card in an efficient way both in terms of memory usage 
and time required for executing complex crypto algorithm.   
 
D. Performance 
 
     The Java card to be used in PayTV receiver need to satisfy 
stringent performance requirements. In payTV system, Control 
word usually changes in every 10 seconds, also control word 
is per channel.  For better user experience, ECM is transmitted 
every 100ms, so Smart card need to decode the ECM message 
and extract Control Word and send it to the receiver via ISO 
7816 interface, once in every 10s minimum. Generally Control 
Word extraction and transmitting it to the receiver involves 
triple DES or AES encryption / decryption. When the receiver 
is switched on or Smart Card is inserted in the receiver, bi-
directional authentication takes place between the smart card 
and the receiver. This involves RSA decryption, Random 
Number Generation and AES decryption. This phase has to be 
completed within 2-3 seconds for smooth user experience.   
 
 
V.        EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND PERFORMANCE 
 
    The experimental  setup consists of a core2 duo PC acting 
as PayTV receiver, a smart card reader is connected to the 
USB port of the PC. JCOP 21 Java card is used to perform the 
cryptographic functions triple DES, AES, RSA. Eclipse IDE is 
used along with JCOP plugins for the Java Card Applet 
Development.  The Java card used here has triple DES, AES 
and RSA coprocessors. The EEPROM size is 72K and RAM 
size is 4096 B. Applets are loaded in EEPROM. 128 bit key 
length for AES and 1024 bit key of RSA is used. 
 
It is observed that Triple DES encryption is taking around 5 
ms, AES is taking around around 10 ms. RSA takes around 
100 ms. As we have seen in the performance requirements, the  
CW changes in every 10 second and ECM is repeated per 
100ms, hence the Triple DES and AES performances are 
acceptable for PayTV application. Also RSA is not used 
runtime for CW extraction and RSA is used only when smart 
card is inserted in the receiver or when the receiver is turned 
on with the smart card, hence the RSA performance is also 
acceptable for the given application of payTV conditional 
access system.  
 
VI.       CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have discussed the payTV conditional access system 
requirements and analysed the advantages and disadvantages 
of Javacard in general and also in the specific context of 
payTV receiver. We have seen that although there are some 
disadvantages of Java Cards but those do not create any 
hindrance for the Java Cards to be used in the payTV receivers 
as part of conditional access system. As per Kerckhoff’s 
principle, an well-known principle in cryptography, security 
though obscurity does not give overall system security in long 
run, hence an open smart card platform like Java Card 
platform, does not compromise the security of a proprietary 
smart card system rather it may enhance the security. Also as 
we have seen from the basic performance data, the triple DES, 
AES and RSA gives the acceptable performance for payTV 
applications. However in some practical payTV systems, there 
will be additional computational load wrt certificate 
verification for mutual authentication, dynamic session key 
generation etc., and in cases, it is required to implement 
Schnorr Algorithm. This will require modulo multiplication 
operation and not be possible to use the RSA co-processor 
directly. In such cases a proper mechanism to use the 
individual building blocks of the co-processor need to be 
designed and made known to the Java Card user to use the 
computational power of the co-processor to achieve acceptable 
performances in such cases also. 
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